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The Kartarpur Pilgrimage Corridor:
Negotiating the ‘Line of Mutual Hatred’
Anna Bochkovskaya
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia
anna.bochkovskaya@gmail.com

After the partition of British India in 1947, many pilgrimage sites important for the Sikhs – followers
of a medieval poet-mystic and philosopher Guru Nanak (1469-1539) – turned out to be at different
sides of the Indian-Pakistani border. The towns of Nankana Sahib and Kartarpur (Guru Nanak’s
birthplace, and residence for the last 18 years of his life, respectively) remained within Pakistani
territory. Gurdwaras located there represent utmost pilgrimage destinations, the Sikhs’ ‘Mecca and
Medina’.
Owing to Indian-Pakistani relations that have deteriorated throughout seven decades, pilgrimage to
Kartarpur has been extremely difficult for India’s citizens. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, official
negotiations were launched concerning the possibility of setting up a visa-free pilgrimage corridor
that would allow Indian Sikhs to easily reach the Kartarpur Sahib gurdwara. The potential corridor
was perceived by many as a channel for cultural cooperation and the embodiment of a zone of peace
at the ‘line of mutual hatred’ – as the India-Pakistan border has often been referred to. Negotiations
received a new impetus when the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) party headed by Imran Khan came
to power in 2018. On November 9, 2019, three days before Guru Nanak’s 550th birth anniversary,
the Kartarpur corridor was inaugurated by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.
This paper discusses the history of and the potential perspectives concerning the Kartarpur pilgrimage
corridor drawing upon the concepts of borders as processes, sets of sociocultural practices, symbols,
institutions, and networks that permanently adopt new meanings and functions.
Key Words: Sikhs, Guru Nanak, Punjab, pilgrimage, borders, India-Pakistan relations
After the partition of British India in 1947, many
pilgrimage sites important for the Sikhs – followers of
a medieval poet-mystic and philosopher Guru Nanak
(1469-1539) – turned out to be at different sides of the
Indian-Pakistani border. Radcliff’s line cut the Punjab
province, home region for the majority of Sikhs in South
Asia, into two parts. As a result, the towns of Nankana
Sahib, Guru Nanak’s birthplace, and Kartarpur, his
residence for the last 18 years of life, remained within
Pakistani territory. Gurdwaras (places where Sikhs come
together for congregational worship) located in those
towns represent the ultimate pilgrimage destinations for
Sikhs, over 21 million1 of whom currently live in India.

faith that incorporated a variety of ideas from medieval
Bhakti (sometimes called ‘mystical Hinduism’)2 and
Sufism (a mystical belief in Islam). It was in Kartarpur
that he worked in the fields together with his two sons
implementing the idea that worldly duties and gṛhastha
(householder) dharma inseparably associated with
individual spiritual quest should be the core of human
life. In Kartarpur, Guru Nanak established his first free
kitchen or langar where any traveller or a person in need
was provided food and shelter irrespective of faith, caste,
age, sex, or social status. Guru Nanak’s disciples – Sikhs
– have been doing their best to follow these principles
ever since.3

Kartarpur boasts a special place in the history of
Sikhism; it was the place where Guru Nanak took up his
residence after long pilgrimages to different destinations
in India and elsewhere, and continued to preach his

2

1

Bhakti (love, devotion, dedication) represented a blend
of medieval religious reform ideas popular in North India,
which focused on private relationship between an adept
and a deity.
3 The history of Sikhism and its current specifics is
discussed in Jacobsen et al., 2017; Uspenskaya, Kotin,
2007. For details of langar’s role in Sikhism see
Bochkovskaya, 2018:300-312; Khokhlova, 2018:313-322.

India’s state of Punjab is home to 16 million Sikhs (77%
of India’s Sikh community) who in turn account for 58%
of the population of the state (Census of India 2011).
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Figure 1: Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib, Pakistan

(Photo by PTI, Hindustan Times, Nov. 09, 2019)

In the 16th century, Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib (Figure
1) was set up at Guru Nanak’s death place; it was rebuilt
in the 1920s by the Sikh ruler of Patiala. Today it is
considered the largest gurdwara in the world covering a
territory of some 6 square kilometres. Located at the west
bank of the Ravi River at a distance of 4 km from the
international border, the Kartarpur Sahib is clearly visible
from the east – India’s – bank. However, from August
1947 until November 2019, when a special pilgrimage
passage to Kartarpur was established, it had remained
virtually out of reach for Sikhs residing in India. That
is why in India’s town of Dera Nanak Sahib across the
border, a special site had been set up allowing darshan
(viewing) of the inaccessible Kartarpur Sahib (Figure 2).

Pakistan, the political border has become an important
tool used for ‘othering’ (Paasi, 2020:1-8; Houtum &
Naerssen, 2002:126).
Such a role for the border is enhanced through its
performance at the few sites and crossings that currently
exist at the ‘line of mutual hatred’ – a common definition
of the Indian-Pakistani frontier (The Economist, July
24, 2017). Along the entire 3,300km border line there
are only two passages: the Attari-Wagah crossing in
Punjab located 32km from Amritsar, India and 24 km
Figure 2: Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib, Pakistan, as
seen from darshan place (viewpoint) at Dera Nanak
Sahib, India

Contextualizing the Kartarpur Corridor
The Indian-Pakistani border is typical in the so-called
traditional understanding of boundaries as fixed lines, or
physical or material entities (Paasi, 2011:11-31; Houtum,
2005:672-679). It is a line that can be interpreted as a
‘fact on the ground’ (Agnew, 2008:175) that is absolutely
visible and strictly guarded for its entire length. In
1947, it split the historical and cultural community of
Punjab that featured a mix of religions and cultures;
an overwhelming majority of Muslims shifted to West
Punjab while Hindus and Sikhs had to migrate to the
eastern part of the region. Since then for both India and

(Photo by Bishwanath Ghosh, The Hindu, Nov. 22, 2018)
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Figure 3: Lowering the Flags at the Attari-Wagah Crossing

Author’s Images

intentions, but to an extent also as a symbol of goodwill
and cooperation between the two countries. A similar, but
smaller-scale and less pompous performance, takes place
at the Ganda Singh Wala – Hussainiwala checkpoint, also
in Punjab. The border crossing there was closed several
decades ago, but the lowering of flags ceremony has been
held at the site every day since 1970 (Jeychandran 2016:
181–202).

from Lahore, Pakistan, and the Munabao-Khokhrapar
railway crossing between India’s state of Rajasthan and
Pakistan’s Sindh province.
One of the most famous manifestations of the border is a
large-scale and colourful ceremony of lowering the flags
(Beating Retreat) held almost every evening since the late
1950s at the Attari-Wagah crossing in Punjab: tall officers
wearing red (India) and black (Pakistan) turbans with
fan-shape decorations march, menacingly gesticulate,
and roll their eyes, as if trying to scare their counterparts
across the border. Even so, when closing up at the border
line, they show utmost uniformity of movements and
gestures, a result of joint drills. The pompous 45-minute
show ends at sunset by opening the massive iron gates
(the border per se) and synchronised lowering of the
flags Figures 3 & 4). With perfect coordination, the two
flags are carefully taken off the ropes, neatly folded and
carried away. Indian and Pakistani officers shake hands,
after which the iron gates remain closed until the next
evening. The dramatic and spectacular show at the border
draws thousands of visitors at each side, with foreign
tourists among them.

These performances are generally supposed to visually
confirm a separating role of the sealed border. They aim at
physical demonstration of a boundary between ‘Us’ and
‘Them’, which reflects the specificity of relations between
India and Pakistan. At the same time, such performances
and practices make the border an ideological entity
(Paasi, 1998:74) verifying the argument that never being
neutral lines,
borders are often pools of emotions, fears, and
memories that can be mobilized space for both
progressive and regressive purposes (Johnson et
al., 2011:61-69).
To this end, borders are both symbols and institutions
that ‘simultaneously produce distinctions between social
groups and are produced by them’ (Paasi, 1998:80).
Notably, as institutions, they construct a continuity for
social interaction by linking the past, present, and future

Performed jointly by the Indian Border Security Force
and Pakistan Rangers, the emotional ritual is generally
perceived as a mutual demonstration of aggressive
30
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Figure 4: Soldiers on Duty at the Attari-Wagah Crossing

Author’s Images

together (Paasi, 1998:80). This is an absolutely different
approach to borders which holds that borders are
artefacts of dominant discursive processes that
have led to the fencing of chunks of territory and
people from one another (Agnew, 2008:176).
Naturally, such processes can vary, so the meaning of the
borders can also change with the course of time. This
reflects the ‘Janus-faced’ character of the borders that
reveals ‘both their conserving and expansive potential’
(Houtum et al., 2005:4).
The same applies to the border crossings / passages
– parts of the border that represent contestation and
transcendence (Kolossov & Scott, 2013:32) being
communication points or portals to the world of ‘the
Other’. Being an integral part of boundary-producing
practices and discourses, in the same way as borders they
‘can be materialized and symbolized to greater or lesser
extents’ (Paasi, 1996). It is in the latter context that this
paper focuses on the role of the Kartarpur pilgrimage
crossing / corridor inaugurated in November 2019 at the
Indian-Pakistani border. 4

4 Perspectives of the Kartarpur corridor conceptualised
through faith-based diplomacy theory are discussed in
Bochkovskaya, 2020:20-25.

A Thorny Way to Separated Shrines
Owing to the specifics of Indian-Pakistan relations that
developed from bad to worse during seven decades of
independent history of both countries, visiting significant
gurdwaras remained extremely difficult for Indian Sikhs.
The procedure for pilgrimage was determined by a number
of bilateral documents, first of all by the 1950 Agreement
signed by India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liakat Ali Khan (Agreement
1950) followed by other arrangements, particularly the
1974 Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines that limited
the annual number of pilgrimage teams from one country
to the other to 20 parties. By 2017, India and Pakistan
opened five shrines from each side for trans-border
pilgrimage: the list included five Muslim shrines in India
(two in Delhi, and one each in Rajasthan, Punjab, and
Uttarakhand), and two Hindu and three Sikh shrines in
Pakistan (one in Sindh, four in Pakistani Punjab) (PantMirza Agreement 2017).
In compliance with these agreements, Sikh jathas
(pilgrimage groups) headed to Pakistan several times
a year to visit three historical gurdwaras, namely, the
Nankana Sahib and Panja Sabib in the Rawalpindi
district, and the Dera Sahib in Lahore. Such visits were
usually timed to coincide with Guru Nanak’s jayanti
31
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Map 1: Location map of the Kartarpur Corridor

Google image

To get into the Pakistani Punjab, pilgrims had to travel
on bypass roads filled with checkpoints. Obtaining the
Pakistani visa usually took a long time; visa fees were
also a problem for potential visitors, and in many cases
Indian Sikhs were denied visas. However, Pakistani
pilgrims willing to visit Muslim shrines at the Indian
territory faced similar difficulties.

Officially, the Kartarpur corridor topic was first touched
upon in February 1999, during India’s Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee visit to Lahore (Dawn Wire Service
February 20, 1999), where he had talks with Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Albeit the negotiations
focused on nuclear security in South Asia, the final
statement (Joint Statement, 1999) noted that the parties
would continue the dialogue on the liberalisation of the
visa regime and border crossing rules. Additionally,
Nawaz Sharif agreed in principle to start the corridor
construction.

Some 7,000 Indians visited Pakistan-based gurdwaras
per year (The Times of India August 22, 2018), but for
an overwhelming majority of India’s 21-million Sikh
community the path to these guardwaras remained closed.
The Kartarpur Sahib also remained inaccessible; despite
its historic significance and near-the-border location, this
gurdwara was not on the list of religious shrines defined
by bilateral agreements. This explains the Indian Sikhs’
preoccupation with the idea of establishing a dedicated
pilgrimage corridor (Map 1) that would allow Indian
followers of Guru Nanak to get quick and easy access
to Kartarpur. However, government-level discussions of
this issue began only in the late 1990s.

One argument in favour of building the corridor was that
in theory it could be used not only by Indian Sikhs, but
also by some Pakistani Sikhs,6 to access the Dera Nanak
Sahib gurdwara (Hindustan Times, November 09, 2019).
From a distant and most hypothetical perspective, it could
also be used by Pakistani Muslims to visit several small
dargahs – shrines of Muslim pirs / saints – that remained
at the Indian side of the border after the 1947 partition
(Snehi, 2019:106–138). From this perspective, getting
access to religious shrines would be of mutual interest.
The Kartarpur corridor was also perceived by the two
sides as a channel of peace and cultural cooperation at
the troubled border.

5

6

(birthday), to Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s5 memorial day,
and to the Baisakhi spring festival, which is extremely
important in the Sikh tradition.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) established the Sikh
Empire, which existed until the annexation of Punjab by
the British in 1849.
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According to various sources, the number of Sikhs in
Pakistan is rather small, with estimates ranging from
20,000 to 40,000.
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However, the emerging positive trends in the negotiations
came to naught with the beginning of border conflict
(Kargil War) in May 1999, with the result that all
discussion items concerning humanitarian cooperation,
the Kartarpur corridor included, were taken off the
agenda.

Phases of the Kartarpur Dialogue
The Kartarpur dialogue developed in fits and starts in
the years that followed, being largely determined by
the personal interests of discussion participants. The
viewpoint of India’s Sikhs remained central in the
negotiations together with – directly and indirectly –
the stand of influential Sikh communities in the USA,
Canada, and Great Britain, especially of the descendants
from the western parts of colonial India that became West
Pakistan in 1947.7
India’s authorities often expressed concern about security
issues. In particular, they noted that Pakistan could
potentially operate the Kartarpur corridor to undermine
stability in India by using the gurdwara for tacit support
of pro-Khalistani forces, and for recruiting radical Sikhs,
especially young people (India Today, November 27,
2018; Hindustan Times, November 07, 2018).8
The Pakistani side was largely concerned over logistics
and infrastructure because Pakistan was to bear a greater
part of the construction costs owing to the location of
the Kartarpur Sahib. According to the American nongovernmental organisation - Institute for Multi-Track
Diplomacy - the infrastructure expenditure including
a highway with pedestrian and bicycle lanes, and
checkpoints, was estimated at $2.2 million for India and
$14.8 million for Pakistan (Kartarpur Project Report,
7

Over 2 million Sikhs reside outside India. For details on
the Sikh diaspora refer to Jacobsen et al., 2017; Hawley,
2013.
8 The separatist movement aimed at the secession of Punjab
and the establishment of the Sikh state of Khalistan got
underway in India from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
It was widely supported by extremists from outside
India. Groups such as the Khalistan Liberation Force
and Sikhs for Justice, among others remain active in the
USA, Canada, and Great Britain, among other countries;
India lists them as terrorist groups. India’s media often
report subversive activities carried out by Pakistanbased pro-Khalistani forces, but it is difficult to evaluate
the accuracy and reliability of such information. The
Khalistan factor in the Kartarpur dialogue is not discussed
in this paper.
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2009). Nevertheless, in 2000, Pakistani authorities
formally gave consent to build a bridge leading to the
Kartarpur Sahib over the Ravi River (The Tribune,
November 16, 2000) and announced several tenders, but
construction works were not launched at that time.
The talks received a new impetus in 2004 after the general
election victory of the United Progressive Alliance led
by the Indian National Congress; India’s new Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, supported the idea
of the Kartarpur Corridor (Sethi 2020). Also in 2004,
the Pakistani side had the gurdwara fully repaired and
rebuilt, possibly using funds allotted by the Sikh diaspora
(The Times of India, May 05, 2017), as the condition of
the shrine remained in a state of disrepair from 1947 until
then. An unpaved road was also constructed to provide
easier access to the shrine.
In 2010, the Punjab Legislative Assembly adopted
a resolution urging India’s central government to
facilitate the setting up of the corridor (Resolution
2010), while in 2012, the same request was addressed
to India’s Foreign Minister by the Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee – an authoritative and influential
Sikh organisation responsible for the management
of gurdwaras in three states (Punjab, Haryana, and
Himachal Pradesh) and the union territory of Chandigarh.
Following the 2014 general elections victory of the
Hindu-focused Bharatiya Janata Party led by Narendra
Modi, Sikhs persisted in lobbying for top-level Kartarpur
dialogue. On multiple occasions, Sikh leaders brought
up this issue in the Indian parliament, but in 2017, the
parliamentary standing committee on external affairs
ruled out the construction of the corridor noting that ‘the
current political climate was not at all conducive’ for
setting up the passage (The Tribune, May 02, 2017).
Nevertheless, negotiations were activated in 2018 when
the Tehrik-e-Insaf party (PTI) headed by a prominent
politician Imran Khan, a former cricket player, came to
power in Pakistan. At the inauguration ceremony, India
was represented by Navjot Singh Sidhu, Minister of
Tourism of Punjab, formerly also a professional cricketer
and Imran Khan’s friend since the 1980s. The ‘cricket
diplomacy’ brought results, enhanced by upcoming
festivities – Guru Nanak’s 550th prakash purab (birthday
celebrations) in November 2019. Soon after Imran Khan’s
inauguration, the Pakistani side announced its intention
to construct and activate the Kartarpur corridor on the
eve of an important date, which is to say by November
33
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Figure 6: Prime Minister Imran Khan inaugurating
the Kartarpur Corridor at the Pakistani side on
November 9, 2019

Figure 5: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi
praying during the launch of the Kartarpur Corridor
on November 9, 2019

(Photo by AP, Livemint, Nov. 09, 2019)
(Photo by ANI, The Hindu, Nov. 09, 2019)

the altruism preached by the Sikh faith. Some Indian
politicians called it jizya – a tax historically levied
in Islamic countries on non-Muslims (India Today,
September 14, 2019). The negotiations continued until
both sides signed a final agreement on the Kartarpur
corridor on October 24, 2019 (Kartarpur Sahib
Agreement, 2019).

12, 2019. At that point India’s parliament took a similar
decision, and in November 2018 both countries launched
the construction of the corridor infrastructure.
In 2018-2019, the issue of peaceful transborder
cooperation was seemingly removed from the agenda
in a number of cases. This happened during the border
conflict in February 2019 after the Pulwama (Kashmir)
attack that saw 40 Indian security personnel killed by
a suicide bomber, with the Indian response being an
airstrike across the line of control. Also, in August 2019,
when India’s government repealed the special status of
Jammu and Kashmir as per Article 370 of the Indian
constitution, Indian-Pakistani relations again suffered
a setback with the escalation of military presence in
border areas, primarily in Kashmir. The future of the
Kartarpur corridor remained at risk, but the construction
works continued without fail and were to a large extent
completed by October 2019.

The document defined the five-year working schedule
for the corridor, stating that it would be operational
every day from dawn to dusk, and all pilgrims from
India would return to their country on the same day.
Travelling was permitted for pilgrims with valid Indian
passports, and for people of Indian origin (PIO) carrying
Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards along with their
passports. Pilgrims also had to register two weeks in
advance at a special website of India’s Ministry of
Home Affairs (www.prakashpurb550.mha.gov.in/). The
maximum number of visitors was limited to 5,000 per
day with additional provisions for more pilgrims coming
on special days like gurpurabs or Baisakhi. In spite of
India’s objections concerning the 20-dollar fee, Pakistan
retained the USD20 service charge.

Simultaneously, negotiations concerning the details
of visa-free visits of Indian Sikhs to Kartarpur Sahib
continued. Firstly, it was necessary to come to an
agreement concerning the definition of what constitutes
an official document (passport or other ID) for purposes
of checkpoints at both sides, and preliminary registration
for visiting the gurdwara. Secondly, Pakistan announced
its decision to introduce a USD20 fee for all pilgrims as
a service charge or partial compensation for expenditures
relating to the corridor infrastructure’s upkeep. India
insisted on fee-free entry, noting that the proposed
sum was prohibitive for many Sikh families; besides,
the compulsory pilgrimage fee did not comply with

The Kartarpur corridor was inaugurated on November
9, three days before Guru Nanak’s 550th prakash
purab celebrated in 2019 on November 12. Imran Khan
inaugurated the Pakistani part, while Narendra Modi did
the same for the Indian part of the passage (Figures 5 &
6). The first pilgrimage group that departed to Kartarpur
comprised prominent Sikh leaders and politicians
including India’s former Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab Amarinder Singh, and
34
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Figure 7: The Kartarpur pilgrimage website

Available at https://prakashpurb550.mha.gov.in/kpr/

the abovementioned Navjot Singh Sidhu, among others.
For the first time in 70 years, Guru Nanak’s followers
could follow the shortest route to the historical gurdwara;
thus, the way to Kartarpur was open.

Perspectives of the Kartarpur Corridor
Constant tensions in Indian-Pakistani relations seemed to
negate all efforts aimed at the Kartarpur dialogue. For this
reason, prospects remained dim until the inauguration in
November 2019. When the passage became operational,
several experts remained sceptical. This scepticism has
been exacerbated by the COVID pandemic restrictions
and sealing of the borders since mid-March 2020.
Nevertheless, my argument is that this project has good
chances for further development.
Negotiations on the present state and prospects of the
pilgrimage corridor, as well as trans-border cooperation
in general, are to both countries’ interest; the Kartarpur
issue is ideologically advantageous for both Pakistan
and India to demonstrate respect to their religious
minorities.9 Ideologically, the place connected with the
9

In Pakistan, religious minorities (Ahmadias, Sikhs,
Christians, and Hindus) account for less than 2% of the
country’s 200-million population. Of India’s 1.3-billion
population 79.8 percent are Hindus while the rest include
Muslims (14.2 percent), Christians (2.3), Sikhs (1.7), as
well as Buddhists, Jains, Parsees and others.

life of the founder of Sikhism is neutral: Guru Nanak is
neither Hindu nor Muslim. In a sense, the Sikh religion
that historically absorbed elements of both Hinduism and
Islam stands ‘above’ these religious systems. To this end,
the bridge over the Ravi river that pilgrims have to cross on
their way to Kartarpur and back acquires a metaphorical
meaning. So it is almost impossible to suspect those in
favour of developing trans-border contacts as taking
either a pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani stand.
Furthermore, the Kartarpur corridor is commercially
feasible for both sides. Already at the initial stage
of setting up the requisite infrastructure at the huge
premises, a substantial number of contractors from the
Pakistani side took part in constructing a 4.5-km highway
including the 900-m bridge across the Ravi River. Being
interested in developing its tourism industry, Pakistan
gets an opportunity to host more foreigners – not only
Sikhs – interested in religious tourism.
India (especially the state of Punjab) also stands to
benefit from the project. By November 9, 2019, a 3.5 km
modern highway in Punjab became operational to bring
pilgrims to the huge passenger terminal building with a
waiting hall, and prayer and medical rooms at the border.
The airport-like building is supposed to demonstrate
India’s glory, prosperity and – by default – dominance.
By setting up international checkpoints and hoisting
35
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